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Abstract
Indonesia has had ten years of constitutional democracy since the end of the Suharto era. In 2009 the country heads 
again to a national election. In the lead-up period the major parties have been pressing not only to reduce the number of 
parties eligible to stand, but to create conditions in which a future president can only come from a major party, which is 
not the situation at present. At the same time, there are almost weekly reports in the Indonesian media of corruption 
allegations and charges against both local and national politicians. This paper considers survey and interview data on 
the opinions of members of the general public in Central Java about the performance of political parties and the political 
elite in the run-up to the 2009 election. Selected newspaper coverage of political corruption cases is also considered.  
Keywords: Indonesia, Politics, General public, Media, 2009 election. 
1. The current political climate in Indonesia 
1.1 The state of play 
According to the General Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum - KPU), as of July 2008, 34 political parties 
are registered and will contest the 2009 Indonesian parliamentary and presidential elections. 16 of these parties are 
well-established and gained a significant proportion of votes in the 2004 elections. They will undoubtably be major 
players in the 2009 general election for seats in the DPR (House of Representatives). The eight most important are: 
secular-nationalist PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle): Suharto’s secular party Golkar (now enjoying 
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new popularity); traditional Muslim party PKB (National Awakening Party); moderate Muslim party PPP (United 
Development Party); modernist Muslim party PAN (National Mandate Party); puritan Islamic party PKS (Prosperous 
Justice Party); ultra-modernist Islamic party PBB (Moon and Crescent Party); and current president Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s PD (Democratic Party). Of these eight – two facts should be noted. Firstly, the presence of five Muslim 
parties in the top eight has the effect of ‘splitting’ the pro-Muslim vote across the country, especially since there are a 
number of smaller Muslim parties among the total of 34 parties registered. Secondly, the real power struggle is between 
PDI-P (popularly symbolised in the figure of Megawati Soekarnoputri), Golkar (currently symbolised by popular 
Vice-President Jusuf Kalla), and PKB (popularly symbolised in the figure of Abdurrahman Wahid known as Gus Dur). 
These three figures (and current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) are regularly satirised and savaged on 
Indonesian television in programs like Republik Mimpi:
Indonesian political parties are the target of fierce criticism by observers, civil society leaders and the general public. 
Opinion surveys show that Indonesians view the parties as corrupt, unresponsive, self-absorbed and ineffective. 
Newspaper columns regularly launch stinging attacks on party leaders, and NGOs have focused many of their programs 
on scrutinising party activities - or the lack thereof (Mietzner, 2008). 
However as Mietzner points out, most media criticism comes from a populist perspective and fails to address 
analytically the problem of party activism. For example, Indonesia's dysfunctional system of party financing leads 
directly to the option of raising funds from wealthy patrons and power brokers. 
1.2 The strengthening of political hegemony 
During 2007-2008, Golkar and PDI-P have been attempting to strengthen their hegemony. ‘Hegemony’ comes from the 
Greek root egemon - leader or ruler. In Gramsci’s work, hegemony refers to cultural leadership through which the 
dominated come to consent to their own domination by an elite. Gramsci's use of hegemony cannot be understood apart 
from his ideas about the state and civil society (Gramsci, 1971, p. 446), and neither can political party hegemony in 
Indonesia be understood separately from the Indonesian state. Gramsci considers Marxian superstructure at two levels – 
‘civil society’ (including families, churches, trade unions, schools) and ‘political society’ (the State). He demonstrates 
how civil society establishes and organises social interaction and consciousness in highly political ways so that 
domination by the state-supported political elite is achieved by consent (social hegemony). Gramsci brings ‘social 
hegemony’ and ‘political government’ together in the ‘integral State’ (p. 267), describing a complex web of practical 
and theoretical activities through which the elite not only justifies and maintains dominance, but wins the active consent 
of the subordinated.  
In Indonesia, as Mietzner (2008) points out; ‘most Indonesian parties are still rooted in distinct social, religious or 
ideological milieus, and the majority of voters feel reluctant to move between those constituencies. These entrenched 
divisions in Indonesian society have obstructed the internal modernisation of the mainstream parties, but have also been 
responsible for their survival’, since people continue to loyally vote for the parties they have traditionally supported 
even though they may not believe the promises of party politicans nor endorse their actions. The relative success of 
PDI-P and Golkar candidates in local elections across the country in the past three years have given the two big parties 
confidence that they can build upon their existing dominance of the national parliament. 
Not only have the two traditional rival parties seriously considered a coalition, which would ensure their absolute 
control of parliament, they have dominated parliamentary debates dealing with electoral regulation reform. For example, 
Golkar and PDI-P held joint meetings in Medan on 20 June 2007, and in Palembang on 24 July 2007, to discuss a 
package of draft political laws (Paket RUU Politik), 
The proposed laws cover electoral thresholds; electoral districts and district size; party financing and campaign 
financing; and voting rights for armed forces personnel. The two large parties are arguing for an increase in the current 
electoral threshold for parties to run in the general election from 3% of seats in the DPR to at least 5% (Baswedan, 2007, 
p. 330). 
A further proposed law is that for each pair of presidential and deputy presidential candidates, their party must have at 
least 30 per cent of DPR seats, or 30 per cent of the vote - on the grounds that a president needs strong parliamentary 
support (Baswedan, 2007, p. 331). Certainly President Yudhoyono has struggled at times because his party won only 8 
per cent of the 2004 vote and controls only 10 per cent of DPR seats (Baswedan, 2007, p. 324). However, there is 
general suspicion of the new electoral regulations because they are felt to discriminate heavily against non-mainstream 
and small political parties in the fielding of candidates. That is, they threaten the spirit of democracy. 
As indicated above, the two parties have poured not only energy but billions of rupiah into campaigning for regional 
and local elections, to the extent that there have been few independent or small party candidates running for office. 
Candidates must now be nominated by a single political party or a coalition of political parties. So Poppy Darsono - a 
former photographic model – was not allowed to run independently for governor in the 2008 election in Central Java 
Province. However, it should be noted that the trend against independent candidates is partly an outcome of the 
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constitution. Indonesian law forces political parties to establish themselves nationwide, even to the sub-district level. 
This broad and deep network operates to strengthen the authority of the major parties and offers significant obstacles for 
new parties to be viably created (Mietzner, 2008), or for independent candidates to gain endorsement. 
1.3 Looking towards the 2009 election  
It can be argued that recent attempts by the major parties to strengthen their hegemony will have a significant impact on 
the 2009 elections, both for the parliament and for the presidency. Currently, such attempts tend to reinforce the notion 
in the public mind that the main agenda of the major electoral players is not only winning on the day, but shoring up 
their respective power bases. We propose that these recent strategies of domination by major political parties have 
brought to the surface the dissatisfaction and lack of trust of ordinary Indonesian citizens in the democratic political 
process. Although the Indonesian people may show strong local loyalties in voting, in essence they do not trust party 
politics or the political elite, especially the political elite from parties well-established in the DPR (House of 
Representatives) or the DPRD (Provincial Legislative Council or City Council). In the eyes of ordinary citizens, 
political parties and members of political elites give the impression of working hard in pursuit of their own ambitions, 
rather than looking after the interests of their constituencies. Marbawi (2007, p. 17) argues that there is danger in the 
neglectful regimes of political parties because the threat of civil violence increases. The widespread belief that there is 
corruption in political circles further undermines the popularity of political parties and increases the likelihood of civil 
unrest. Mass public frustration, as Marbawi reminds us, can become a serious threat to democracy and to political 
parties themselves. Evidence of this trend in public response to political corruption and ineffectiveness is shown by 
frequent wide-ranging protest action and demonstrations about a number of economic and social issues.  
2. Research questions and methodology 
Given the current political climate as described above, it is productive to examine what ordinary Indonesians think 
about the actions by political parties and by members of the political elite in the run-up to the 2009 general election. An 
opinion poll by Kompas found that of 837 respondents, 79 per cent agreed that political party orientation was more 
towards power than towards people’s interests. 71.3 per cent thought the political recruitment process was unsatisfactory, 
and 73.1 per cent thought political parties were marred by internal conflicts and splits among the elite (Sultani, 2007, p. 
5). We seek to explore these ideas further in this paper. 
2.1 Research questions  
Our study posed three main questions: 
What do members of the general public think about the performance of political parties and political elites in the run-up 
to the 2009 general election? 
Do social-demographic factors such as level of education, family income, sex, and age affect the way people think 
about the performance of political parties and the performance of political elites? 
How are the mass media, especially the print media, representing political parties and political elites during this period?  
2.2 Methodology 
The study employed a multi-method strategy consisting of a survey, in-depth interviews, and textual analysis of 
newspaper reports. The survey was conducted in 2008 in Solo, Central Java, with 180 adult respondents. The survey 
asked: (a) for social and demographic details of respondents; (b) what the respondents thought of the performance of 
political parties; and (c) what respondents thought of the performance of political elites. The survey data was subject to 
a descriptive analysis of frequencies. Correlations were tested using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. 15 interviews 
were conducted with people from a variety of social backgrounds including: garbage collector (pemulung); street 
singers/beggars (pengamen); small-scale business-owners; and university students. Interviewees were asked about their 
views on the performance of political parties and political elites. Finally, political news reports in the following media 
sources were subject to a textual analysis: Kompas, Jawa Pos and  Republika daily newspapers; and Tempo weekly 
news magazine.  
3. Survey findings 
3.1 Correlations 
The survey data was first analysed using calculations of Pearson’s coefficient to establish whether there was any 
correlation between social and demographic variables and responses. The following table summarises the results of this 
analysis (two-tailed). 
Insert Table 1 here. 
The two variables which show a significant correlation with both political party performance appraisal and political 
elite performance appraisal, are family income, and level of education. For the family income variable, there was a 
significant difference between respondents with a high family income and those with a low family income. Respondents 
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who reported a high family income tended to have a low opinion of both political party performance and the 
performance of the political elite. Similarly, respondents who reported a high level of education did not rank the 
performance of political parties and political elites highly. 
3.2 Performance of political parties 
Survey questions asked about the performance of political parties according to the following functions: (a) aggregating 
and articulating the aspirations of the people; (b) leadership recruitment; (c) formation of government; (d) political 
identity; (e) mass mobilization; (f) social integration. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
Table 2 shows that over half the respondents were dissatisfied with the performance of political parties in three key 
areas: aggregating and articulating the aspirations of the people (66.7%); leadership recruitment (51.1%); and social 
integration (56.1%). Respondents were less dissatisfied with political party performance in the areas of political identity 
and mass mobilization. Significantly, the highest level of dissatisfaction – two-thirds of respondents - was with the 
extent to which political parties took account of the wishes of their constituents and represented these in the public 
domain and the sites of government. We might infer from this that at present Indonesian political parties are not 
perceived as adequately fulfilling the demands of the citizenry to address their interests.  
3.3 Performance of the political elite 
To explore views about the performance of the political elite (senior elected decision-makers), respondents were asked 
about four aspects of their performance: (a) whether the political elite engaged closely with the people; (b) whether the 
political elite made a serious attempt to strive for what people wanted; (c) whether the political elite demonstrated 
dedication to serving the public interest; and (d) the orientation of the political elite to the use of power.  
Insert Table 3 here.  
In summary, less than a quarter of respondents were satisfied with the performance of the political elite. The highest 
scores for dissatisfaction were in respect to power orientation, and the issue of having a close relationship with the 
people. 
4. Interview data findings 
4.1 Performance of political parties 
Data from the in-depth interviews tended to confirm public dissatisfaction with the performance of political parties, for 
example:  
It seems to me that the performance of political parties is unsatisfactory. Many people suffer from malnutrition, they 
have very limited access to education and jobs. Who is in the wrong? They [political parties] do not represent the 
demands of the people (Tumin, male, 48, garbage collector). 
Tumin added that he thought Indonesian political parties ignored wong cilik (Javanese: people of low social status). 
Many comments were made about price increases, for example,  
Political parties do not perform in an optimal way to address what people want. Increases in the price of goods, 
especially fuels, have made people suffer a lot recently (Lusi, female, 44, teacher). 
It was also often claimed that people were compelled to articulate their demands by organizing and/or joining protest 
movements, for example,  
So far the performance of political parties has been much less than optimal and because of this people use protest 
movements to articulate their aspirations. Political parties make very few attempts to get close to their constituents. 
They only do it during the period of the election campaign (Anti, female, 22, university student). 
4.2 Performances of political elites 
Interview data confirmed the dissatisfaction of the general public with the performance of the political elite. This 
frustration was not just with the elected representatives of the two big secular parties, but with Muslim politicans also, 
for example,  
It is very clear that they [political elites] are primarily oriented to power even though they may come from religious 
[Muslim] groups (Lusi, female, 44, teacher). 
It was claimed that members of the political elite run for election to get power and to maintain power rather than 
dedicating themselves to striving for the demands of the people, for example: 
They think only power, power, power. They work much more for their own interests than for the interests of the people. 
So it is meaningless what they have done so far, whether we are talking about political parties or the political elite. They 
simply perform badly and so they disappoint the public (Tumin, male, 48, garbage collector. 
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There were some inferences of nepotism, for instance: 
It is far from satisfactory. The Indonesian political elite mostly works for personal interests, including the interests of 
family and allies, not for the interests of the people (Sardiyo, male, 36, policeman).  
There were also some more analytical critical views expressed. 
Yes. Politics means power. In Indonesia the political elites performed poorly for a long time, representing only a narrow 
range of perspectives and interests. So look what’s happened now. The interests of the people and the nation are still 
marginalized by the interests of the political elite - personal interests as well as crony interests. Conflicts of interest 
therefore often escalate and involve those from many different disenfranchised groups (Sardi, male, 25, junior 
university lecturer).  
Sardi indicates that even though politics is usually understood as an inevitable struggle for power, the Indonesian 
political elite of the New Order (the Suharto regime) manipulated power unfairly. He inmplies that even now, after 
democratic reform, the political elite still seems to care little either for the demands of the people or for dealing with the 
problems of the nation. He points to clashes of interest between the political elite and a range of lobby groups, which 
spills over into demonstrations and civil unrest. 
It was claimed that the interests of the political party itself were inevitably defended over the interests of the people, for 
example:  
Members of the political elite are put there by their political parties. However, members of the political elite that often 
criticize the system fall out of favour with the party leaders. So the demands of the people are subsequently 
marginalized. It is easier for members of the political elite to work for their own interests than to work for the interests 
of the people (Lusi, female, 27, teacher). 
Lusi maintains that members of the political elite are implicity encouraged to work primarily for the interest of the 
political parties they come from rather than for the interests of the people they represent. She makes a further useful 
point. It may be true that there is less provocation in politicians working for their own personal interests than in 
criticising the status quo, as far as party power-brokers intent on their own ambitions are concerned. 
5. Media analysis findings 
The third research question for this study asked how the performance of Indonesian political parties and the political 
elite is being represented by the mass media in the run-up to the 2009 election. To this end, national newspapers 
Kompas and Republika, and regional newspaper Jawa Pos were analysed, as well as Tempo – a national news magazine. 
Overall, our textual analysis indicates that political parties and the political elite were invariably represented in a 
negative way. The negative focus was usually on: (a) the dominant role of the major political parties in pushing for new 
regulations; (b) internal party dissent; and (c) allegations of corruption against specific political parties and/or members 
of the political elite. 
5.1 Party domination and new regulations 
Domination by the two major political parties – Golkar and PDI-P - was a key theme in news media articles pertaining 
to elections, whether local government elections or the forthcoming 2009 legislative and presidential election. For 
example, a news item in the Jawa Pos (14 November 2007, p. 2) titled  Ambisi Golkar-PDI-P Terus Dilawan
(ambitions of Golkar-PDI-P continue to be opposed) explained how a group of smaller parties in the DPR fought 
against the joint suggestion by Golkar and PDI-P to decrease DPR seat allocation in electoral districts from 3-12 seats to 
3-6 seats – a move which would have increased seats for the major parties and decreased electoral opportunities for 
minor parties. The article quoted the head of the PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi – a minor Muslim party) as saying that 
a decrease of DPR seat allocations for electoral districts would eliminate opportunities for small parties and newly 
established parties to get seats. He argued that this opportunity should be a guaranteed democratic right of formally 
recognised political parties. Most of the smaller parties expressed agreement with the PBR position. 
In another example, on Friday 14 March 2008, a Kompas opinion piece (p. 5) proclaimed Paket UU Politik Langkah 
Hegemoni Parpol Besar (package of political laws: further steps towards major party hegemony). The leftist writer 
condemned attempts by the major parties to ‘simplify’ the party system because what they were really proposing were 
tactics to maintain parliamentary and local government domination. He argued that most of the arguments for 
‘simplification’ of the electoral process returned to the idea that a strong parliament and a strong president in 2009 
would need majority support in the DPR. However, such a move, he argued, would come at a cost to true democracy. 
Not only would smaller parties vanish, but large-scale party coalitions would be empowered to take even less notice of 
the demands of the people. 
Republika newspaper belongs to the opposite political camp to Kompas and usually takes a right-wing view, yet it too 
has been reporting on the hegemonic practices of the major parties. In the 26 October 2007 issue (p. 3), a news item was 
headed SBY Dicoba Diganjal dengan Syarat Dukungan Capres (an attempt to block SBY [Susilo Bambang Yudoyono] 
through the proposed president’s party support law). Golkar members of the DPR suggested a pre-requisite minimum 
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30-35 per cent legislative voter support for the party of any candidate to nominate to run for president. This law would 
in theory prevent incumbent president Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) from being nominated as a presidential 
candidate because his PD party gained fewer seats than this. Such a move can be interpreted as yet another example of 
attempts by the major parties to strengthen their hegemony.  
5.2 Internal party conflicts 
The 2007-2008 period was characterised by troubles between President SBY (from minority party PD) and 
Vice-President Jusuf Kalla (Golkar), and by internal party conflicts. The mass media paid much attention to these 
disputes, emphasising many other quarrels and scandals in parties such as PBR, PKB and PDI-P.  
A notable example in Kompas was the extensively-reported conflict in the political elite of PKB in 2008. PKB is the 
party linked to Nahdlatul Ulama – the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia with a vast support base in Java. 
Former Indonesian president and party founder Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) fell out with his nephew Muhaimin 
Iskandar (Cak Imin), the head of Dewan Tanfidz (the PKB Executive Council). At a stacked plenary meeting of PKB on 
27 March, Muhaimin was asked to step down - Muhaimin Iskandar Diminta Mundur (Kompas 2008, 28 March, p. 15). 
The issue seems to have been one of disloyalty to Gus Dur himself. However, Muhaimin refused to step down, instead 
filing a lawsuit against Gus Dur and his faction of the PKB. The Indonesian Supreme Court ruled in July 2008 that 
Muhaimin should be party chairman while Gus Dur should remain as the party patron only. Gus Dur has publicly 
condemned the decision and the factional split has not been healed. While official PKB press releases put a positive spin 
on the outcome, it is widely acknowledged that this factional conflict threatens the electoral performance of the PKB in 
the 2009 general election. In early September 2008, it was reported that Gus Dur had instructed PKB supporters loyal to 
him to picket election commission offices across the country, a move he said would deter the KPU from recognizing 
Muhaimin’s faction as the official representative of the PKB (The Jakarta Post, September 9, 2008). The fallout from 
this internal rivalry may result in a significant fall in support for PKB from the mass of Javanese traditionally loyal to 
Nahdlatul Ulama.
5.3 Allegations of corruption 
The Indonesian press regularly reports allegations and findings of corruption against elected members of government - 
both local and national. It could be widely assumed that there are few if any members of the political elite who are not 
engaged in some form of corruption, because of the frequency with which such reports appear. Taking the month of 
April 2008, for example, every form of print media in the country reported that PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – 
United Development Party) national politician Al Amin Nur Nasution had been arrested while bribing a Riau 
government official – Azirwan - at the Ritz Carlton in Jakarta. Tempo in July pointed out that Nasution stood to gain 
from the removal of protected forest status in Riau for urban development. He was also accused of sexual misconduct. 
Nasution was subsequently expelled from the PPP. On 10 April 2008, it was widely reported in the news media that 
former Bank Indonesia governor Burhanuddin Abdullah had been formally charged with bribing a number of politicians, 
involving the misappropriation of over 100 billion rupiah from bank deposits. Earlier, on the 4 April 2008, Kompas had 
reported that two local politicians in Jember had been charged with misappropriating 450 million rupiah from legal aid 
funds and 726 million rupiah from local parliament funds intended for civic works. 
Since April 2008, charges against politicians of bribery, corruption and sexual misconduct have continued. Of recent 
note was the widely-reported July 2008 arrest of PBR politician Bulyan Royan - caught red-handed taking a bribe from 
businessman Dedi Suwarsono. In a lead article Kompas (2 July 2008, p. 5) reported that other DPR politicians were also 
implicated. The lawyer for Suwarsono stated that the billions of rupiah Royan handed over in a North Jakarta Hotel 
were for the procurement of ocean patrol boats by the Ministry of Transport. Royan stood to gain financially from the 
tender. The most recent reported corruption case involves President Yudhoyono himself. He stand accused of protecting 
one of his senior advisors - Heru Lelono – who was apparently behind a ‘miraculous’ hybrid rice crop scandal 
(Fitzpatrick 2008a). 
These examples are only the tip of the iceberg. It was recently claimed in English-language newspaper The Jakarta Post
on 30 August 2008 that ‘data from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) earlier revealed at least 35 lawmakers - 15 from 
PDI-P, eight from Golkar, eight from PPP, three from PD, three from PAN and one from PKS - who had allegedly been 
involved in corruption’. Meitzner reports that ‘more than 1000 local legislators, almost ten per cent of the total number 
of parliamentarians across Indonesia, have been investigated for corruption since 2004’ (2008). There are weeks in 
which Indonesian national newspapers, and radio and television news broadcasts are literally crammed with stories of 
political corruption. It seems obvious that this has an effect on the way members of the general public view political 
parties and politicians.  
6. Discussion 
6.1 Past practice 
We detect two contradictory discourses in current general public attitudes to politics which may help illuminate the 
mystery of Indonesian voters’ ‘love-hate relationship with their political parties’ (Mietzner, 2008).  For despite their 
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frustration, Indonesians usually turn out to vote in large numbers, 
In 1999 and 2004, participation in national elections ranged between 75 and 93 percent, a rate that even consolidated 
democracies would consider healthy. Even in direct elections for local government heads, where the role of the parties 
is weaker, an average of 69 percent of registered voters took part in the ballots (Mietzner, 2008). 
Foreshadowing our identification of the two principle voter discourses that lie behind such apparent loyalty to the 
process of voting, Vickers (2007, p. 222) speaks of ‘post-Suharto Indonesia’s combination of optimistic reformism and 
cynical fatigue’. 
6.2 Cynical fatigue vs ‘bread and circuses’ 
The first voter discourse: - wary disbelief, enshrines a deep conviction that whatever formal political process may be 
about, it is almost never about representing the interests of the people. This corresponds to Vickers’ term - ‘cynical 
fatigue’. During the New Order period, citizens voted under pressure for one of only three tightly-controlled parties and 
there was never any doubt that Golkar would win. Studies by Hainsworth et al. (2007) and Hill (1996), for example, 
reveal how the New Order government literally bought loyalty and legitimation, bludgeoning any opposition or 
independent movement into an underground existence. Elections were manipulated. Votes were sometimes rewarded by 
local infrastructure improvements in education, health, and farming, but often not. The New Order government 
achieved domination with the support of military; through the hegemonic political party Golkar; and through oil export 
income.  
Yet at the same time, during the New Order election campaigns (and even now), there was a great air of festivity during 
elections, involving colour, music, rallies, parades, fanfare and small gifts. The term ‘bread and circuses’ comes 
originally from the Romans. Commentators in ancient times were frustrated to find that rather than sticking to civic 
principles, voters followed whichever political leaders offered food and entertainment – ‘bread and circuses’ - during 
election campaigns. The ‘bread and circuses’ strategy appears to have flourished in Indonesian politics. For example, 
election campaigns used to rely (and still do to some extent) on popular artis dangdut (indigenous rock music 
singers/dancers) travelling to even the smallest villages on the campaign trail (Fitzpatrick, 2008b, p. 16). The musical 
theme of Indonesian election campaigns was taken further when (male) politicians started singing as part of their 
election campaigns in 1999, and this reached its height in the 2004 election with several candidates, including current 
president SBY, releasing albums. This history of general election festivity and entertainment is productive for 
understanding why Indonesian voters regularly turn out, despite their conviction that there will be little for them in the 
long run. Far from trivial, political party-sponsored festivities and entertainment during election campaigns illuminate 
the workings of political hegemony. As Gramsci’s theories imply (see section 1.2 above) hegemony operates through 
the targeted organisation of the social interaction and consciousness of the people. Party-sponsored election festivities 
and entertainment – even singing politicians - constitute an effort to convince local people that the party in question can 
and will please them. Such apparently light-hearted events are attempts to win the active consent of the subordinated in 
Gramsci’s terms.    
Yet while local voters might be happy to be wooed by ‘bread and circuses’ on the party election campaign trail, that 
does not mean they really expect anything to change once politicians are voted in. As we saw in the interview data 
excerpts above, when unemployment, malnutrition and rising prices are mentioned, there is sense of fatalism in the way 
these are discussed. Although it might reasonably be expected that political parties should try resolve these problems, 
there seems to be a sense of weary certainty that they will not. As Sultani (2006, p. 4) states in his commentary on the 
performance of the DPR, ‘low commitment to nation; giving in to pressure; decline of moral integrity - make the pace 
of change tedious in the eyes of public’, even despite the recruitment of young, and better-educated DPR members over 
the past ten years. 
The discourse of ‘cynical fatigue’ is fuelled by daily political reports in the mass media such as those we discuss above. 
If readers and viewers only hear about politicians in relation to scandal, corruption and in-fighting, and rarely about 
politicians trying to meet the needs of their constituencies, then it should not be surprising that of 837 respondents in the 
Kompas poll over 70 per cent were dissatisfied and disillusioned (Sultani, 2007, p. 5). It should be noted that Kompas 
readers tend to be middle-class and well-educated. Kompas offers a more sophisticated and detailed analysis of the 
current political landscape than the populist media, and this perhaps gives a clue as to why there was a correlation in our 
survey data indicating that the higher the income and education of respondents, the lower their opinions of political 
parties and the political elite. 
6.3 Loyalty and hope 
The second important voter discourse is one of entwined loyalty and hope. This discourse emerged strongly after 1998, 
although its roots probably lie in the revolutionary birth of the Indonesian nation. Despite the pattern of poor 
performance by political parties and politicians, Indonesian voters continue to be on the whole loyal and optimistic. 
Optimism was at its height during the 1999 election campaign when democracy flourished for the first time. 48 political 
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parties were able to contest seats and the military took a neutral role. However, not everyone was satisfied with the 1999 
election outcome. For example, most voters did not grasp how the president was elected according to the constitution of 
the time, and while Megawati Soerkanoputri’s PDI-P won the election, she did not become president. Disappointment 
led to widespread riots.  
Subsequently, as democratic optimism in the post-reform era declined, Indonesian political parties lost focus, and lost 
the confidence of voters. By early 2006, Indonesian political parties had an even worse performance record. Internal 
dissent and corruption encouraged an exceptionally negative view of politicians and of party politics (Sultani, 2006, p. 
5). Yet as Mietzner (2008) points out, people still turn up to vote in relatively high numbers, and in doing so 
demonstrate their loyalty to specific social, cultural, religious and/or ideological symbols and constituencies, 
articulating a strong sense of the continuity of family and communal voting practices over time. In yet another sense, 
voting signifies an act of hope. In the comments of interviewees above for example, there is an implied sense of outrage 
that their hopes and expectations have not been met, rather than a lack of hope. 
The discourse of loyalty and hope is also fuelled by political reports in the media. As well as news items on political 
scandals and in-fighting, Indonesian newspapers and television broadcasters cover the campaign trail of local 
government candidates and party leaders as well. So, for example, when Vice-President and Golkar leader Jusuf Kalla 
visits his place of origin - Sulawesi – local media sources report his visit very positively, stressing Kalla’s commitment 
to the people of Sulawesi. And of course, politicians talk up for reporters the importance of their own regions and 
ethnic/cultural constituencies when they are campaigning ‘at home’. Megawati Soekarnoputri is expert at this, drawing 
heavily upon the sentimental legacy of her father – President Soerkarno - when she campaigns in Central Java and Bali. 
The political courting of local loyalties signifies once again how hegemony operates through the targeted organisation 
of the social interaction and consciousness of the people, in this case the history and tradition of ethnic and geographical 
solidarity. The appeal of political parties to forms of local primordialism represents yet another example of attempts to 
secure the active consent of the subordinated.    
6.3.1 Fear 
Loyalty and hope are also fuelled by fear. Certainly a great deal has changed in Indonesian politics since 1998. 
Democratic reforms have resulted in a free media and free and open elections at every level, including local government. 
Regional autonomy legislation has seen much greater political control move to local constituencies. The president is 
now elected by the people. The press has much greater freedom to report on news, and there has been an extraordinary 
increase in the amount of news reported (Pawito, 2002). This relative freedom and expansion is often interpreted as 
proof of democracy. Yet the current processes of Indonesian democracy have long been falling well short of peoples’ 
expectations, and the threat of local or mass political violence was constant in the post-Suharto years (Vickers, 2007, p. 
213), at least until 2004.  
At present, the Indonesian economy is growing strongly and the poverty rate is falling (The Jakarta Post, August 26, 
2008). Yet these gains could be swiftly brushed aside if the country descended once again into civil unrest due to 
political anger and frustration. In their slogans and campaigns, all eight significant political parties, whether secular or 
Muslim, promise not only ‘clean’ government, but civil stability and continued economic growth. Politicians routinely 
make press statements to this effect which perhaps build a sense of hope for the public even while they might feel it is 
unwise to trust such promises. Perhaps many want to believe political promises of civil stability because they fear the 
alternative of increasing civil violence. 
6.4 Media reports: A challenge to hegemony? 
It should be noted that the active consent of the subordinated (the masses) to the political hegemony of dominant 
Indonesian political parties could be challenged by relevations of greed and corruption in the mass media. For example, 
ordinary citizens understandably experience disappointment and anxiety when they read about the apparently honest 
representatives of their chosen party becoming DPR members who go on to become corrupt intermediaries passing 
non-transparent budgets through parliament that benefit local government officers. It must have been particularly 
galling for loyal supporters of some parties to read that the politicians they helped elect have even gone so far as to 
appropriate funds intended for natural disaster prevention and relief.  
The question we must ask however, is whether press revelations of political corruption do in themselves challenge the 
political hegemony of the major parties, or whether such media reports actually encourage apathy and cynicism, leading 
to widespread voter disaffection which implicitly strengthens the hegemony of the dominant political players. 
6.5 Golput 
Given the arguments presented in this paper we might well anticipate that if ‘cynical fatigue’ wins out over loyalty and 
hope for the voting public we will see a much higher rate of golput (lack of a formal vote: either no vote or a ‘donkey’ 
vote) in the 2009 general elections than in previous elections. Sujatmiko (2007) maintains that the development of a 
fully-fuctioning democracy in Indonesia is hampered by lack of political accountability and increasing distance between 
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political process and the citizenry. There is still a lack of transparency at all levels of the legislature. The general public
has little opportunity to participate in debate over the formation of public policies, through a referendum for instance. 
When people feel deeply disappointed, or disconnected, they either do not vote, or they may disfigure the voting form. 
The rate of golput has been high in some recent local elections. For example, in the 2008 election for the Governor of 
Central Java 41.5 per cent of registered voters golput (Kompas, 10 April 2008, p. 1). 
In post-reformasi Indonesian elections there are almost always protests and riots afterwards because supporters of 
defeated candidates are not satisfied, and accusations of misconduct fly. Sugiarto (2005, p. 6) maintains that one cause 
of ubiquitous post-election demonstrations in Indonesia is lack of public trust in the actual electoral process, especially 
the nomination and funding of party candidates, and the counting of votes. Local government election organizers are 
frequently regarded as unreliable, and there is lack of trust in local law enforcement. Disappointed and angry voters 
may choose not to vote again in any election, believing that there will be no integrity at all in the formal process of 
constitutional democracy. If this turns out to be the case for the 2009 general election, we can expect to see the rate of 
golput escalate. 
7. Conclusion 
From the data assembled in this paper we may safely assume that the Indonesian public in general does not hold 
political parties and political elites in high esteem. Table 1 indicates that according to our survey results dissatisfaction 
is more marked for those with a higher income and better education. The frequency tables indicate that three-quarters of 
180 respondents were dissatisfied in various ways with the performance of political parties and the political elites. This 
finding was confirmed in the interviews. Realizing the aspirations of the people, social integration, and leader 
recruitment, were the areas in which political parties caused disappointment. On the performance of political elites 
repondents were most dissatisfied with their grabs for power (lobbying for self-serving electoral change, doing shady 
deals with opposition parties, graft, corruption and nepotism); and the distance between political elites and the people. 
In short, it seems to be widely understood that most politicians are inherently self-serving, greedy, ruthless and amoral. 
We argued above in sections 5 and 6.2 above that the dissatisfaction of the general public is fuelled by the negative 
mass media representation of political parties and political elites, as our selected print media examples demonstrate. The 
major negative discourses of this media representation were found to be: (a) the tendency of major political parties to 
defend their power base at any cost; (b) internal conflicts of parties and factionalism; and (c) allegations and charges of 
corruption and scandal against politicians and party officials. 
So what kind of picture emerges here in the run-up to the 2009 election? The data assembled in the paper indicate that a 
generally negative view of politicians and political parties is held by both the mass media and the general public. 
Although it appears that a more analytically critical and intellectual perspective is generated by the middle class, and by 
newspapers such as Kompas that inform the opinions of better-educated people, in Java ordinary people –wong cilik - 
also feel disillusioned and disappointed. In one direction this indicates increasing cynicism and apathy, which are likely 
to translate into a high rate of golput in the 2009 election. In the other direction, the disillusionment of the masses with 
the major parties and the political elite opens the way for minor political parties running a strong anti-corruption hard 
line, such as the Islamist PKS party, to gain widespread appeal. Perhaps the deepest and most serious outcome though, 
could be widespread mistrust of the political process of democracy itself. If the Indonesian public feel that their trust in 
constitutional democracy for the nation has been betrayed in the rush by the major parties for greater political hegemony, 
then they are likely to express that rage and frustration in protest actions and demonstrations that may escalate into mass 
civil unrest, threatening the economic and social gains of the past ten years.  
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Table 1. Correlation between socio-demographic variables and responses N = 180 
Variable 
View of political party 
performance 
View of political elite 
performance 
Sex            -0.115    
          (0.124)       
          -0.067 
          (0.374)    
Occupation            0.135 
          (0.071) 
          -0.042 
          (0.573) 
Age           -0.046 
         (0.541) 
          0.075 
         (0.371) 
Family income            -0.250 ** 
         (0.001) 
          -0.187* 
          (0.012) 
Level of 
education
          -0.271 ** 
         (0.000) 
          -0.262 ** 
         (0.000) 
 Note: 
 * Significant at 0.05 
 ** Significant at 0.01 
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Table 2. Responses on the performance of political parties N=180 
Political Function Responses Freq % 
1. Aggregating and articulating 
the aspirations of the people 
Satisfied  
Neutral  
Dissatisfied  
20
40
120 
11.1 
22.2 
66.7 
2. Leadership recruitment  Satisfied  
Neutral 
Dissatisfied
23
65
92
12.8 
36.1 
51.1 
3. Formation of government  Satisfied  
Neutral 
Dissatisfied
27
74
79
15
41.1 
43.9 
4. Political identity  Satisfied  
Neutral 
Dissatisfied
48
81
51
26.7 
45
28.3 
5. Mass mobilization  Satisfied  
Neutral 
Dissatisfied
51
79
50
28.3 
43.9 
27.8 
6. Social integration  Satisfied  
Neutral 
Dissatisfied
35
44
101 
19.4 
24.4 
56.1 
Table 3. Responses on the performance of the political elite N=180 
Aspect of Performance Responses Freq % 
1. Has a close relationship with 
the people  
Satisfied  
Neutral  
Dissatisfied  
19
71
90
10.6 
39.4 
50
2. Strives to meet the demands 
of the people  
Satisfied  
Neutral 
Dissatisfied
22
98
60
12.3 
54.4 
33.3 
3. Demonstrates dedication to 
serving the public interest 
Satisfied  
Neutral 
Dissatisfied
35
97
48
19.4 
53.9 
26.7 
4. Orientation to the use of 
power  
Satisfied  
Neutral 
Dissatisfied
14
36
130 
7.8 
20
72.2 
